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(Emotional Support) Peacocks on a Plane:
Revising Federal Reasonable Accommodations Laws for Emotional
Support Animals
Tallulah Lanier *
In an era of increased healthcare and medication costs, using the comfort of an
emotional support animal for disability mitigation presents a valuable alternative to
an overtaxed healthcare system. The rise in use of emotional support animals has
outpaced the regulation of them, however. Four key federal statutes affect the legal
rights and obligations of assistive animals under federal law—the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Fair Housing Act, and the Air Carrier
Access Act. While all four require accommodations for service animals, only the latter
two require the same for emotional support animals. Even so, there is no consensus on
how to define emotional support animals—the Americans with Disabilities defines
them by exclusion, while the Air Carrier Access Act, until recently, defined them by
inclusion into a broader “service” animal category, and the rest merely defer to the
former. The resulting gap and confusion in federal regulation produce rather absurd
results: peacocks on planes, alligators in apartments, and plenty of confusion
regarding whether anyone can do anything about either.
This Article argues for eliminating this gap in federal regulations with clear,
prescriptive revisions to key disability laws and their reasonable accommodation
requirements as applied to emotional support animals. Namely, it proposes that
Congress should amend select reasonable accommodations laws so that the definition
of “emotional support animal” mirrors the definition for “service animal.” These
proposed revisions address three main problems plaguing the emotional support
animal landscape: (1) fraudulent misrepresentation of pets as emotional support
animals, (2) misrepresentation of absurdly untenable, wild, or exotic pets as emotional
support animals, and (3) lack of accessibility to emotional support animals for
disabled individuals who could greatly benefit from them. An emotional support
animal under the proposed framework would be a dog, cat, or miniature horse whose
presence, or a task it performs, provides comfort or emotional support to a disabled
individual. Moreover, this Article calls for eliminating the statement of need, which
would further align the emotional support animal framework with that of the service
animal framework. In doing so, it clarifies accommodation provider responsibilities
with regard to these animals and fair use of a valuable accommodation option for
those disabled individuals seeking to benefit legitimately from it.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 28, 2018, an Indian peacock 1 named Dexter patiently sat on a
luggage cart handle at Newark International Airport. 2 His green, blue, and brown
plumage was on full display as his owner, Brooklyn-based performance artist
Ventiko, attempted to negotiate the animal’s passage on a United Airlines flight to
Los Angeles. 3 United Airlines denied the peacock passage on the plane because he
did not meet a myriad of guidelines, including size and weight descriptions. 4
According to a company spokesperson, United Airlines notified Ventiko that Dexter

1
2

3
4

A peacock is a male peafowl. See Peacock, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/animal/peacock (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
Lindsey Bever & Eli Rosenberg, United Changed Its Policy for Emotional Support Animals. That Peacock
Still Can’t Board, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2018, 3:35 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/animalia/wp/2018/01/30/a-woman-tried-to-board-a-plane-with-heremotional-support-peacock-united-wouldnt-let-it-fly/.
Id.
Id.
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could not board three times before she arrived to board the flight. 5 Ultimately,
Dexter and Ventiko made their journey to Los Angeles by car. 6
This story on its own would be a delightful foray into the world of animal
travel. However, the curious case of Dexter has another, more legal, twist: Dexter’s
owner describes the animal as an “emotional support” peacock. 7 What is an
emotional support peacock? A peacock that provides emotional support. How does
one know that Dexter truly provides Ventiko emotional support? Because Ventiko
says so. 8 The circular nature of the Dexter debate is exemplary of a larger national
conversation—what is an emotional support animal, what qualifies as one, and how
does an interested party recognize one?
All of these questions would be easy to answer if the words “emotional
support” were replaced with “service.” Federal law defines a service animal as a
specifically trained dog used by a disabled individual to perform a task that directly
relates to one or more of the individual’s disabilities. 9 Federal law prescribes similar
regulations for the use of miniature horses but does not strictly classify them as
service animals. 10 In a classic depiction of a service animal, one might envision a
guide dog. 11 Not so classically, one might imagine (or search the internet for) Fancy
Dancer, Chunky Monkey, Glitter Bug, and Patty Cake, the quasi-service miniature
horses 12 who help their owner maintain stability during his trips to town. 13
Unlike service animals, emotional support animals lack a consistent
definition within federal law. 14 In fact, many applicable federal laws do not define

5
6
7
8
9

10

11

12
13

14

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2020); see also ADA Requirements: Service Animals, U.S. DEP’T. JUST.,
https://www.ada.gov/service_animals_2010.htm (last updated Feb. 24, 2020) (defining service animals as
“dogs that are individually trained to do work or perform tasks for people with disabilities.”).
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(i)(3) (“Paragraphs 35.136(c) through (h) of this section, which apply to service
animals [that are dogs], shall also apply to miniature horses.”). By regulatory construction, miniature
horses will be accommodated in the same manner as service animals where logistical and safety concerns do
not dictate otherwise. Id.
See Dog Guides for People with Vision Loss, VISIONAWARE, https://www.visionaware.org/info/everydayliving/essential-skills/an-introduction-to-orientation-and-mobility-skills/dog-guides-for-people-with-visionloss/1234 (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(i)(3).
Next 9NEWS, Mini-Horses are This Man’s Service Animal of Choice, YOUTUBE (Feb. 13, 2017),
https://youtu.be/kd5ZTWakUPk. While the video refers to miniature horses as service animals, they are
more accurately labeled quasi-service animals. See supra note 10 discussion.
Compare, e.g., U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV., FHEO-2013-01, SERVICE ANIMALS AND ASSISTANCE ANIMALS
FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN HOUSING & HUD-FUNDED PROGRAMS, at 1 (2013),
https://archives.hud.gov/news/2013/servanimals_ntcfheo2013-01.pdf (limiting the ADA definition of service
animal to “include only dogs” and excluding emotional support animals), with Traveling by Air with Service
Animals, 85 Fed. Reg. 79,742, 79,743 (Dec. 2, 2020) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382) (noting that
“[c]arriers are not required to recognize emotional support animals as services animals and may treat them
as pets” but not mandating such treatment).
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emotional support animal. 15 These laws instead define service animal and exclude
any other animal. 16 For instance, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
provides a thorough definition of service animal, noting for what purposes one can
and cannot be used. 17 In contrast, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehab Act”), the
Fair Housing Act (FHA) and its subsequent relevant amendments, and the Air
Carrier Access Act (ACAA) do not take as thorough of an approach. 18
Such an inconsistency creates an exploitable gap in federal law, especially
with respect to disability and reasonable accommodations. 19 Up until January 2021,
if an airline was not sure whether the peacock in the ticket line was an emotional
support animal or simply a pet, it could not properly assess its responsibilities
under the ACAA. 20 Similarly, if a renter shows up on move-in day with a ball
python that she claims offers her comfort when the ball python “hugs” her, must the
apartment complex allow the ball python to reside in a unit free of charge in
accordance with the FHA? 21 Or can management assess a pet fee?
This Article argues for eliminating this gap in federal regulations with clear,
prescriptive revisions to key disability laws and their reasonable accommodation
requirements as applied to emotional support animals. Namely, I propose that
Congress amend select reasonable accommodation laws so that the definition of
15

16

17

18
19

20

21

Compare 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2020) (defining service animals under the ADA), with 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2018)
(neither defining nor referencing service or emotional support animals under the Rehab Act).
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (“Service animal means any dog that is individually trained to do work or perform
tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric,
intellectual, or other mental disability. Other species of animals, whether wild or domestic, trained or
untrained, are not service animals for the purposes of this definition.”); 14 C.F.R. § 382.3 (2020) (“Service
animal means a dog, regardless of breed or type, that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for
the benefit of a qualified individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual,
or other mental disability. Animal species other than dogs, emotional support animals, comfort animals,
companionship animals, and service animals in training are not service animals for the purposes of this
part.”); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2020) (“Service animal means any dog that is individually trained to do work or
perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric,
intellectual, or other mental disability. Other species of animals, whether wild or domestic, trained or
untrained, are not service animals for the purposes of this definition.”); 24 C.F.R. § 5.306(1) (2020) (“A
domesticated animal, such as a dog, cat, bird, rodent (including a rabbit), fish, or turtle, that is traditionally
kept in the home for pleasure rather than for commercial purposes. . . . This definition shall not include
animals that are used to assist persons with disabilities.”).
See discussion infra Part II.A.i; see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.104. The ADA itself does not define service animal,
but the regulations passed pursuant to the ADA do. For the sake of clarity, this Article will simply refer to
the ADA and its regulations as the ADA (other statutes will be referred to likewise).
See infra Part II.A.i.
See Jason Nark, The Emotional Support Alligator That Helps a York County Man Deal with Depression,
PHILA. INQUIRER, https://www.inquirer.com/news/alligator-esa-peacock-dogs-animals-crocodiles-supportdepression-20190124.html (last updated Jan. 24, 2019) (detailing exploitation of emotional support animal
provisions in housing); Denise Crosby, Disabled Marine, Neighbors at Odds over His 20 Support Chickens,
BEACON-NEWS (June 3, 2018, 8:50 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/aurora-beaconnews/opinion/ct-abn-crosby-chickens-st-0603-story.html (same); Adam Boult, Passenger Takes Turkey on
Flight as ‘Emotional Support Animal’, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 12, 2016, 8:05 PM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/howaboutthat/12096210/Passenger-takes-turkey-on-flight-asemotional-support-animal.html (same for air travel).
See 14 C.F.R. § 382.117 (2020) (outlining an airline’s responsibilities with respect to service and emotional
support animals under the ACAA).
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 14, at 3.
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“emotional support animal” mirrors the definition for “service animal” but with an
expanded list of qualified species. An emotional support animal under the proposed
framework would be a dog, cat, or miniature horse whose presence, or task it
performs, provides comfort or emotional support to a disabled individual. Moreover,
this Article calls for the elimination of the statement of need, which would further
align the emotional support animal framework with that of the service animal.
These proposed revisions address three main problems plaguing the emotional
support animal landscape, including (1) fraudulent misrepresentation of pets as
assistive animals, (2) misrepresentation of exotic and untenable animals as
assistive more broadly, 22 and (3) lack of accessibility. 23
To better understand the regulations underlying the emotional support
animal debate, Part I provides an overview of how applicable federal laws define
disability and reasonable accommodations. Part II parses through the definitions
for service and emotional support animals, collectively known as “assistive
animals,” to properly lay the foundation for a discussion of how two particular laws
are exploited. Part II closes with select examples on how individuals take advantage
of the gaps in federal law to represent absurdly untenable, wild, or exotic species as
“emotional support animals.” This further emphasizes the need for revisions to the
four federal statutes addressed here. Part III(A) then suggests the solution: the
ADA, 24 the Rehab Act, 25 the FHA, 26 and the ACAA 27 should be collectively revised
to align their definitions of emotional support animals in accordance with this
Article’s proposed revisions. Then, Part III(B) outlines how the revisions achieve the
previously stated justifications and the value of each. Finally, Part III(C) reflects
upon the potential results and implications of these revisions and why the scales
balance in favor of the proposed revisions.
I. FEDERAL DISABILITY RIGHTS LAWS: AN OVERVIEW
This Article will focus on the assistive animals debate under federal law—
specifically, it will analyze the four main federal laws addressing reasonable
accommodations. This self-imposed limitation does not mean, however, that
disabled individuals have no protections for the use of assistive animals under state

22

23
24
25
26

27

See infra Part III.B.ii (discussing, as an example, tigers bred by Joseph “Joe Exotic” Maldonado-Passage,
whose owners successfully argued that they were “emotional support” tigers).
See infra Part III.B.iii.
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
12101–12213 (2018)).
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (2018)).
Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801–819, 82 Stat. 73, 81–89 (1968); see also Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619
(2018)).
Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2018).
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law. Most states also protect assistive animals under disability, public
accommodations, or human rights laws. 28 This Article will not address those laws.
First, Section A will outline the definition of disability that will be used
throughout the remainder of this Article. Section B will then discuss the
foundations of federal disability laws—their origin and their current forms. Next,
Section C will explain the method by which disability laws protect individuals:
reasonable accommodations.
A. Definition of Disability
Various federal laws covering disability rights contain a definition of
disability. 29 While Section B will delve into the history of disability protection laws,
this section will focus more specifically on the definition that will be used for the
remainder of this Article. How federal law defines disability is critical to the
premise of this discussion—a service animal must be used in connection with the
owner’s disability. 30 The same is currently not true for emotional support animals. 31
Therefore, if an individual does not meet the requisite criteria to be considered
disabled, any animal they use in connection with a condition (whether perceived as
disabling or otherwise) would not in turn meet the definition of a “service animal.” 32
This is ultimately a threshold question to the discussion underlying the assistive
animal discussion.
Under the ADA, a disability is defined “with respect to an individual” as: (1)
“a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual;” (2) “a record of such an impairment;” or (3) “being
regarded as having such an impairment.” 33 The other relevant federal laws also
adopt this definition. 34 When in the next section, and the rest of this Article, I refer
to a disabled individual, I adopt the definition outlined above. 35

28
29

30
31

32
33
34

35

See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-7-3, 28-11-3 (West 2020); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 123-b (McKinney
2020); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 47-b (McKinney 2020).
See 29 U.S.C. § 705(20) (2018) (adopting the ADA’s definition of disability for 29 U.S.C. § 794); Fair Housing
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (2018); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2018); 49 U.S.C. §
41705(a) (2018) (adopting ADA’s definition of disability for ACAA).
28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 35.136(a) (2020); see also ADA Requirements: Service Animals, supra note 9.
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (“The crime deterrent effects of an animal's presence and the provision of emotional
support, well-being, comfort, or companionship do not constitute work or tasks for the purposes of [the
service animal] definition.”). This Article’s proposed revisions would mandate that the emotional support
animal be used in connection with a disability. See infra Part III.A.
28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 35.136(a); see also ADA Requirements: Service Animals, supra note 9.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining “major life activities"); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)
(defining “regarded as having such impairment”).
See 29 U.S.C. § 705 (adopting the ADA’s definition of disability for the Rehab Act Section 504); 42 U.S.C. §
3602 (defining “handicap” under FHA identically to disability under ADA); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 49 U.S.C. §
41705(a) (adopting the ADA’s definition of disability for ACAA).
While the FHA terms this definition as “handicap,” this Article will refer to this in context as a “disability.”
See 42 U.S.C. § 3602. This Article avoids use of the latter, while a legally operative term, given that it does
not accurately and respectfully describe individuals with disabilities.
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B. The Foundations of Disability Law
Laws protecting disabled individuals are relatively new to the United States.
Prior to the Social Security Act of 1935, 36 most laws governing disabilities were
detrimental to disabled persons. 37 Public opinion on disabiliites inhibited the earlier
adoption of beneficial regulation—disabilities were originally categorized as medical
problems or “defects,” with a focus on solving and eliminating disabilities. 38 This
reflected a long-held theological notion that a disability was punishment from God
for noncompliance with God’s teachings. 39 The Supreme Court did nothing to
change this notion for many years—if anything, the Court reinforced it. 40
In the years following the civil rights movement of the 1960s, disability
advocates lobbied for similar access and protections as those won by racial equality
advocates. 41 Ultimately, a paradigm shift occurred. 42 Beginning in the 1970s,
policymakers began treating individuals as members of a minority group rather
than merely as functionally limited people. 43 This paradigm shift opened the door
for policymakers to consider “architectural, institutional, and attitudinal barriers”
that prevented individuals with disabilities from full access and integration. 44
Leading the way in the efforts for integration was the federal government with the
Rehab Act. 45 While most of the Act simply incorporated or rephrased provisions

36
37
38

39
40

41

42
43

44

45

Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74–271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
See infra text accompanying notes 38–41.
JACQUELINE VAUGHN SWITZER, DISABLED RIGHTS: AMERICAN DISABILITY POLICY AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUALITY
13 (2003); cf. Phil Pangrazio, A Brief History of Disability Rights and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), LIVABILITY MAG. (July 14, 2015), https://ability360.org/livability/advocacy-livability/historydisability-rights-ada/ (“In Christian theology, disability was characterized as something that could be cast
upon you for not following the teachings of God.”).
Pangrazio, supra note 38.
See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (noting that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough” in
deciding to uphold Virginia’s involuntary sterilization of “mental defectives”); see also Virginia Sterilization
Act of 1924, 1924 VA. ACTS 569. This became a model decision for the later American eugenics movement.
See Lutz Kaelber, Eugenics: Compulsory Sterilization in 50 American States, U. VT.,
http://www.uvm.edu/~lkaelber/eugenics/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
A Brief History of the Disability Rights Movement, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE,
https://www.adl.org/education/resources/backgrounders/disability-rights-movement (last visited Feb. 11,
2020).
See Harlan Hahn, The Political Implications of Disability Definitions and Data, 4 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD.
41, 42–43 (1993).
See id.; VAUGHN SWITZER, supra note 38, at 14. Contra 42 U.S.C. § 1382c (2018) (defining various disabilities
in terms of functional limitations for Social Security purposes).
VAUGHN SWITZER, supra note 38, at 14; see also The Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151–
4156 (2018) (requiring federal agencies and programs to design and construct new facilities, as well as alter
existing facilities, to promote accessibility for disabled individuals).
29 U.S.C. § 701(b)(3) (2018) (“[T]o ensure that the Federal Government plays a leadership role in promoting
the employment of individuals with disabilities, especially individuals with significant disabilities, and in
assisting States and providers of services in fulfilling the aspirations of such individuals with disabilities
for meaningful and gainful employment and independent living.”).
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previously codified elsewhere, buried in the Rehab Act was a provision initially
ignored by many—Section 504. 46
The original language of Section 504 was relatively short but immensely
powerful. 47 Modeled after the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Section 504 prohibited
discrimination against “handicapped” 48 individuals solely because of their
disability. 49 However, the text of Section 504 was not self-enacting; rather, agencies
needed to adopt specific guidelines to implement the law. 50 It took nationwide
action, like sit-ins, to lobby for Section 504 guidelines with Departments of Health,
Education, and Welfare regulations. 51 Ultimately, Section 504 failed to define
disability. 52
Section 504 and the later sit-ins did not end the disability rights movement,
however. The law’s scope was limited to only federal agencies and entities that
receive federal financial assistance or grants. 53 The disability rights movement then
shifted focus, pushing for a more comprehensive and far-reaching statute that
would better mirror the broad-reaching protections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 54
The ultimate result was the ADA. 55

46

47

48

49
50

51

52
53
54
55

Id. § 794; see also Britta Shoot, The 1977 Disability Rights Protest That Broke Records and Changed Laws,
ATLAS OBSCURA (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/504-sit-in-san-francisco-1977disability-rights-advocacy.
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973) (“No otherwise qualified
handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section 7 (6), shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 794).
Current revisions use “disabled” since “handicap” is generally construed to align with the functional
limitation mindset. See 29 U.S.C. § 794; see also Dana S. Dunn & Erin E. Andrews, Choosing Words for
Talking About Disability, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Oct. 2015),
https://www.apa.org/pi/disability/resources/choosing-words.
Susan Schweik, Lomax's Matrix: Disability, Solidarity, and the Black Power of 504, 31 DISABILITY STUD. Q.,
¶ 3 (2011).
While not included in the initial language of Section 504, later revisions clarified this. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)
(“The head of each such agency shall promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
amendments to this section made by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental
Disabilities Act of 1978.”); see Shoot, supra note 46.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (DHEW) was the precursor to the Department of Health and
Human Services, which also included the Social Security Administration until their bifurcation in 1995. See
Organizational History, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/history/orghist.html (last visited Feb. 11,
2020). The most famous of these sit-ins occurred in 1977 at a San Francisco DHEW field office. Shoot, supra
note 46. The San Francisco sit-in also holds the record for the “longest non-violent occupation of a U.S.
federal building in history.” Id.
As amended, Section 504 now adopts the ADA’s definition. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(9) (adopting the ADA’s
definition of disability for 29 U.S.C. § 794).
Id. § 794(a).
A Brief History of the Disability Rights Movement, supra note 41.
Id.
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The ADA prohibits discrimination in a wide variety of settings, including
employment, 56 services provided by state and local governments, 57 public
accommodations, 58 transportation, 59 and telecommunications. 60 These protections
are available to any “qualified individual,” which the law defines as an individual
with a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major
life activities,” a person who has a history or “record of such an impairment,” or a
person who is perceived by others as “having such an impairment.” 61 Under the
ADA, covered entities are required to make reasonable accommodations to allow
qualified (disabled) individuals to access services or employment opportunities
equally. 62 Reasonable accommodations are discussed in more detail in the following
section.
In addition to the ADA and the Rehab Act, several other federal laws
currently protect disabled individuals from discrimination. 63 While there are many
of these laws, 64 this discussion will focus on two laws in addition to those already
discussed: the FHA 65 and the ACAA. 66 Because these four laws address most
entities and facilities in which a conversation on the admissibility of an assistive
animal would occur, and because many other disability discrimination laws mirror
the ADA’s classifications on disability and reasonable accommodations, limiting the
analysis and revisions to these four laws presents no challenge to the efficacy of the
solution proposed in Part III. 67
The FHA was originally passed in 1968 in response to the civil rights
movement. 68 The original language protected against discrimination based on race,
color, religion, and national origin in the sale, rental, or advertisement of housing. 69
56
57

58
59
60
61
62
63

64
65

66

67
68

69

42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2018).
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ADA UPDATE: A PRIMER FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 1, (2015),
https://www.ada.gov/regs2010/titleII_2010/titleII_primer.pdf (“Title II of the ADA applies to all State and
local governments and all departments, agencies, special purpose districts, and other instrumentalities of
State or local government . . . .”). See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213.
Id. § 12182.
Id. §§ 12141–12165.
47 U.S.C. § 225 (2018).
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
See, e.g., Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
See A Guide to Disability Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 2020), https://www.ada.gov/cguide.htm, for a
complete list of federal laws codifying disability rights.
See id. Note, however, that the guide does not include the relevant 2010 ADA revisions, which will be
discussed in greater detail later. See infra Part II.
The FHA protects disabled individuals from discrimination in housing rentals and sales and in the terms
and conditions of those transactions, and mandates reasonable modifications for the disabled individuals,
where needed. 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
The ACAA prohibits airlines from discriminating against passengers solely based on their disabilities in a
variety of ways, including in the construction of a plane’s cabin and the allowance of assistive animals on
flights. See generally 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2018).
See infra Part III.A.
See Fair Housing: History, FAIR HOUSING ACCESSIBILITY FIRST,
https://www.fairhousingfirst.org/fairhousing/history.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
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In 1974, Congress added sex as a class; disability and familial status followed in
1988. 70 Within the FHA, the term “handicap” is used in place of “disability,” but the
Act’s operating definition is identical to that of a disability under the ADA. 71 The
disability protections outlined in the 1988 revisions (The Fair Housing Amendments
Act) are the basis for this discussion’s inclusion of the FHA. 72 As amended, the FHA
protects disabled individuals from discrimination in the sale or rental of housing
and provides that requests for reasonable modifications to housing arrangements
may be required to meet the disability-related needs of the buyer, renter, or any
person associated with the buyer or renter. 73
Disabled individuals also have protections when traveling by air in the
United States, regardless of the carrier’s country of incorporation. 74 The ACAA was
first enacted by Congress in 1986 to address the unique difficulties travelers with
disabilities face on commercial airline flights. 75 The ACAA, as amended, mirrors the
definition of disability in the ADA. 76 Similar to the acts previously discussed, the
ACAA also requires carriers to make modifications to their policies, practices, and
facilities to provide service to disabled individuals. 77
The existence of these laws alone is a great milestone in disability rights law.
However, they do not inherently guarantee protections to disabled individuals
seeking to participate in all aspects of society. Rather, these four federal statutes
rely upon reasonable accommodations provisions to outline and implement the ways
in which disabled individuals are guaranteed an “opportunity to participate.” 78

70
71
72
73
74
75

76
77
78

Fair Housing: History, supra note 71; Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102
Stat. 1619 (1988).
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h), with id. § 12102(1).
See generally Fair Housing Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 100-430.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f).
14 C.F.R. §§ 382.1–.35 (2020); see also Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2018).
Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-435, 100 Stat. 1080 (1986) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 41705). Prior to the ACAA, commercial airlines had little to no obligation to accommodate disabled
individuals. See U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 597 (1986); see also Brief
for Respondents, Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597 (No. 85-289), 1985 WL 669459, at *3 (“As a result
[of the lack of requirements for commercial airlines], handicapped persons may meet passengers at airports,
but they have no protection from discriminatory treatment if they wish to use those airports for their
primary purpose and fly on a commercial airline.”). Disabled individuals still face difficulties with airline
travel today, including damage or loss of a wheelchair. Ace Ratcliff, Air Travel is Often a Humiliating
Nightmare for People with Disabilities, HUFFPOST (July 18, 2018, 5:46 AM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/opinion-ratcliff-travel-disability_n_5b4aa626e4b022fdcc59f658.
Compare 49 U.S.C. § 41705(a), with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
14 C.F.R. § 382.13(a) (2020).
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(C).
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C. Reasonable Accommodations
Various federal laws protect disabled individuals against discrimination in a
variety of circumstances, including employment, 79 housing, 80 public
accommodations and services, 81 and common carriers. 82 Specifically, entities
covered by these federal laws must allow disabled individuals access to their
services, properties, or activities and provide any “reasonable accommodations” that
will further this access. 83
Generally speaking, a reasonable accommodation under the ADA is an
alteration to the service or transportation method that allows the “opportunity to
participate.” 84 This is true unless such alteration would cause a direct threat to the
health and safety of others 85 or where the accommodation “would fundamentally
alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or
accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 86 In those cases,
no accommodation is required. 87 Also exempted are private clubs, 88 and religious
organizations and their facilities. 89 The other federal laws discussed have similar
provisions.
79

80

81

The Rehab Act first prohibited employment discrimination based on disabilities in federal agencies or those
entities that receive federal financial assistance and mandated federal agencies to develop specific
affirmative action plans to hire disabled individuals. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2018). The ADA now more broadly
prohibits employment discrimination against disabled individuals solely because of their disabilities,
whether they are employed by state and local governments, private entities, or places of public
accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
The FHA protects disabled individuals from discrimination in housing rentals and sales and in the terms
and conditions of those transactions and mandates reasonable modifications for the disabled individuals
where needed. Id. § 3604(f)(1)–(3).
The Rehab Act, as amended, provides that no disabled individual
solely by reason of her or his disability, [can] be excluded from the participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive
agency or by the United States Postal Service.

82

83

84
85

86
87
88

89

29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The ADA also provides protections for disabled individuals in places of public
accommodations, including those run by private entities, and on intercity and commuter rails. 42 U.S.C. §§
12132, 12143(a), 12162(a)–(b), 12182(a).
For disabled individuals traveling by air, the ACAA prohibits airlines from discriminating against
passengers solely based on their disabilities. 14 C.F.R. § 382.11 (2020).
See 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (2018) (mandating federal agencies to annually report and describe how the needs of
disabled individuals are met); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3) (describing prohibitions on discrimination in housing);
14 C.F.R. § 382.13 (2020) (requiring air carriers to make modifications to their policies, practices, and
facilities to provide “nondiscriminatory service” to disabled individuals).
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(C).
See id. § 12182(b)(3); cf. U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 402 (2002) (“The question in the present
case focuses on . . . the plaintiff's need to show that [a reasonable] ‘accommodation’ seems reasonable on its
face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases.”).
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
See id.
Id. § 12187 (adopting 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) into the ADA). This is a holdover from Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Id. § 2000a(e).
Id. § 12187.
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The Rehab Act requires federal programs or entities receiving federal
assistance to provide reasonable accommodations both for employees 90 and for those
who might otherwise seek access to the entity’s services, 91 including its information
technology resources. 92 Section 504 requires individual agencies to promulgate
methods by which their respective agencies will comply with the provisions and
submit them before Congress. 93
For instance, the Social Security Administration (SSA), a federal program
subject to the Rehab Act, outlines its reasonable accommodations policies for the
public seeking to access agency programs on its website, both generally 94 and on
specific pages for the deaf or hard of hearing 95 and the blind or visually impaired. 96
If a disabled individual requires a reasonable accommodation to access an SSA
facility, they may call in advance, write to, or visit a local agency office. 97
The FHA requires covered entities to allow both (1) “reasonable modifications
of the existing premises” and (2) “reasonable accommodations in rules, policies,
practices, or services” to promote a disabled individual’s equal opportunity to enjoy
the premises. 98 The disabled individual seeking modifications to an individual unit
or private space must cover the cost upfront or agree to restore the premises to its
original condition. 99 Additionally, covered entities are required to design and
construct public use and common spaces in an accessible manner. 100 Similar to the
ADA, the FHA exempts religious organizations and private clubs that provide
lodging for their members from complying with the provisions. 101 These
organizations may give preference to their members. 102
90

91

92
93
94
95
96
97

98
99
100
101
102

See 29 U.S.C. § 791(b), (d) (2018) (requiring affirmative action in hiring disabled individuals and regular
reporting on how “special needs” of disabled individuals are met); see also id. § 794a(a)(1) (requiring courts
to consider the cost of workplace accommodations in suits for redress, indicating the requirement for such
in appropriate settings).
This is an implied provision. Section 504 specifies that small providers need not make significant structural
alterations “if alternative means of providing the service are available.” Id. § 794a(c). No such exception
exists for other providers. See id.; see also Rose v. U.S. Postal Servs., 774 F.2d 1355, 1363 (9th Cir. 1984)
(“Section 504 requires structural changes to provide access to federal programs if no less costly solution is
possible.”).
This provision applies to both resources for employees and those seeking to utilize the program’s services.
29 U.S.C. § 794d(a)(1)(A).
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
Accessibility Help, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/accessibility/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
See If You Are Deaf or Hard of Hearing, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/people/deaf/ (last visited Feb.
11, 2020).
See Special Notice Option for the Blind or Visually Impaired, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/people/blind/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
This applies to all forms of disabilities as prescribed by Section 504, but the agency only makes the
information available under its page for the deaf and hard of hearing. See, e.g., If You Are Deaf or Hard of
Hearing, supra note 95.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A)–(B) (2018).
Id. § 3604(f)(3)(A).
Id. § 3604(f)(3)(C)(i).
Id. § 3607(a) (2018).
Id. However, religious organizations may not utilize this exemption where they restrict membership “on
account of race, color, or national origin.” Id.
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Under the ACAA, carriers “must modify [their] policies, practices, and
facilities . . . to provide nondiscriminatory service to a particular individual with a
disability.” 103 Carriers are also prohibited from refusing transportation solely
because of a disability 104 and limiting the number of individuals with a disability on
a particular flight. 105 Further, airlines may not charge disabled passengers for the
services or accommodations provided in relation to their disability. 106
The requirements under the four federal statutes outlined in this Part serve
as the backdrop to Part II, which will discuss the role of assistive animals as a form
of reasonable accommodation under these laws. How these four statutes define—or
fail to define—both service and emotional support animals contributes to the
regulatory confusion discussed next.
II. ASSISTIVE ANIMALS AS REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS
Generally speaking, assistive animals fall into one of two categories—they
are either service animals or emotional support animals. 107 The distinction between
the two, while often subtle, is key to determining the right to reasonable
accommodation for these animals under existing federal law. 108 Section A will
outline the definitions of both types of assistive animals under the ADA, the Rehab
Act, the FHA, and the ACAA. Using the definitions as a foundation, Section B will
then discuss how these definitions are utilized in each of the relevant reasonable
accommodation requirements under the same federal laws. Finally, Section C will
highlight several examples of absurdly untenable, wild, or exotic, alleged emotional
support animals in housing and on planes. This will further emphasize the need for
this Article’s proposed revisions, which will be discussed in Part III. 109
A. Assistive Animals Defined
The model definition for assistive animals—specifically service animals—
originates from the ADA. The remainder of the federal laws that will be discussed,
with the exception of the ACAA, followed suit by either adopting or modifying the
ADA’s definition. The following two subsections underline the important effect of

103
104

105
106
107
108

109

14 C.F.R. § 382.13(a) (2020).
Id. § 382.19(a)–(b). Air carriers may, however, refuse transportation due to safety concerns that may be
related to an individual’s disability, such as the risks resulting from a communicable disease. Id. §§
382.19(c), 382.21.
Id. § 382.17.
Id. § 382.31.
JACQUIE BRENNAN & VINH NGUYEN, SW. ADA CTR., SERVICE ANIMALS AND EMOTIONAL SUPPORT ANIMALS iii
(2014), https://adata.org/sites/adata.org/files/files/Service_Animal_Booklet_2014(2).pdf.
For instance, service and emotional support animals are treated equally under the FHA. See U.S. DEP’T OF
HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 14, at 1. In contrast, the ADA makes a clear distinction between the two.
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2020).
See infra Part III.A.
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this Article’s proposed revisions. 110 Specifically, the degree of variation between
these laws means that an individual seeking accommodation for an assistive animal
(service or emotional support) must be knowledgeable about the differences when
traveling through spaces governed by each law. The first subsection exemplifies
that problem. Additionally, as Part II(A)(2) will show, federal law makes little
attempt to robustly define emotional support animals—the gap the revisions
proposed in Part III seek to address. 111 As such, those who genuinely benefit from
one must understand their rights under each law, as do those who potentially seek
to exploit the gap by claiming their absurdly untenable, wild, or exotic animals
provide emotional support worthy of statutory legitimacy.
i. Service Animals Defined
The model definition for service animals comes from the ADA. Many agencies
covered under the Rehab Act 112 and the statutory language of the FHA 113 derive
their definitions from the ADA, while the ACAA took a different approach up until
January 2021. 114 The ADA defines a service animal in great detail:
[a]ny dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for
the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical,
sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability. . . . The
work or tasks performed by a service animal must be directly related
to the individual's disability. Examples of work or tasks include, but
are not limited to, assisting individuals who are blind or have low
vision with navigation and other tasks, alerting individuals who are
deaf or hard of hearing to the presence of people or sounds, providing
non-violent protection or rescue work, pulling a wheelchair, assisting
an individual during a seizure, alerting individuals to the presence of
allergens, retrieving items such as medicine or the telephone,
providing physical support and assistance with balance and stability
to individuals with mobility disabilities, and helping persons with
110
111
112

113
114

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.
See, e.g., HALLEX I-2-0-8(A)(4) (Soc. Sec. Admin. 2014), https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/hallex/I-02/I-2-08.html (adopting the current service animal provisions of the ADA to the Social Security Administration’s
interpretation of Section 504); see also Velzen v. Grand Valley State Univ., 902 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1047
(W.D. Mich. 2012) (noting that HUD did not apply the ADA revision to their interpretation and
implementation of the FHA and Section 504).
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 14, at 1.
Compare Service Animals (Including Emotional Support Animals), U.S. DEP’T TRANS.,
https://www.transportation.gov/individuals/aviation-consumer-protection/service-animals-includingemotional-support-animals
[https://web.archive.org/web/20210111060529/https://www.transportation.gov/individuals/aviationconsumer-protection/service-animals-including-emotional-support-animals] (last updated Apr. 17, 2020),
with American with Disabilities Act, 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2020). For the current regulations regarding
assistive animals on planes, see Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 85 Fed. Reg. 79,742, 79,743, 79,774
(Dec. 2, 2020) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382).
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psychiatric and neurological disabilities by preventing or interrupting
impulsive or destructive behaviors. . . .[T]he provision of emotional
support, well-being, comfort, or companionship do not constitute work
. . . for the purposes of this definition. 115
Essentially, a service animal under the ADA is a dog that is trained to
perform tasks for a disabled individual; but emotional support is not
considered a task under this regime.
While the above does not make it readily apparent, the ADA’s regulations
allow for two species to be accommodated. First, the Act allows for individuals with
disabilities to use dogs of any breed. 116 An entity assessing whether to accommodate
a dog that meets the requirements above may exclude the animal if it is not under
the owner’s control or the owner does not take “effective action to control it” or if the
animal is not housebroken. 117 If the entity excludes the animal for those reasons, it
is required to allow the disabled individual the chance to utilize the entity’s services
without the animal present. 118 Otherwise, the ADA prescribes no requirements for
the animal’s behavior. 119
In addition to dogs, the ADA also makes specific provisions for the use of
miniature horses in connection with a disability. 120 While the ADA does not term
these as “service animals,” the provisions are largely identical. 121 In addition to the
criteria for dogs outlined above, a miniature horse is subject to additional
accommodations considerations. 122 An entity from which the individual with the
miniature horse seeks accommodation may consider the following factors before
granting an accommodation: (1) whether the entity can accommodate the “type,
size, and weight” of the animal; (2) whether the owner has “sufficient control” of the
animal; and (3) “[w]hether the [animal’s] presence in a specific facility compromises
legitimate safety requirements that are necessary for safe operation.” 123 Should the
entity deem any consideration an issue, it may exclude the miniature horse. 124 Like
dogs, miniature horses may also be excluded for being ineffectively controlled or

115
116

117

118
119
120
121

122
123
124

28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (emphasis added).
See id. (defining a service animal as “any dog”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 14,
at 1 (noting that “[b]reed, size, and weight limitations may not be applied to an assistance animal” under
the ADA).
28 C.F.R. § 35.136(b). However, a leash or other tether is not necessarily required to maintain control;
where such would inhibit the work of the service animal, the owner must maintain control via oral or other
commands. See id. § 35.136(d).
Id. § 35.136(c).
Id. § 35.136.
See id. § 35.136(i).
See id. § 35.136(i)(3). (“Paragraphs 35.136(c) through (h) of this section, which apply to service animals
[that are dogs], shall also apply to miniature horses.”). This Article ultimately proposes that individuals
with disabilities be allowed to utilize miniature horses for either service or emotional support and would
require entities to accommodate where health, safety, and logistical interests permit doing so.
See id. § 35.136(i).
Id. § 35.136(i)(2)(i).
See id. § 35.136(i)(1)–(2).
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lacking housetraining. 125 Otherwise, the ADA prescribes no requirements for the
animal’s behavior. 126
An animal of either species must be accommodated only if the animal is both
required for a disability and trained to perform a task relating to the owner’s
disability or disabilities. 127 Under the ADA, a representative of the place of public
accommodation may ask an individual who presents with either a dog or a
miniature horse only two questions to determine whether the animal qualifies for
accommodations: whether the animal is “required because of a disability” and “what
work or task,” if any, “the animal [is] trained to perform.” 128 If the individual does
not require the animal for a disability or it is not trained to perform a specific task,
then the animal likely does not qualify for accommodations.
However, if it is “readily apparent” the animal performs specific tasks, such
as pulling a wheelchair or helping with an observable mobility or balance issue, the
entity may not make any inquiries. 129 The entity from which an individual seeks
accommodation may never ask for documentation of the animal’s status, such as
training, licensing, or certification records. 130 These documents are not required
under the ADA. 131 In fact, the Department of Justice (DOJ) does not recognize any
private licensing as proof of an animal’s service-related status and explicitly warns
of their fraudulent nature. 132 When it becomes apparent, either through inquiry or
observation, that the animal qualifies as a service animal, the entity must permit
the animal to accompany the disabled individual “in all areas of a public entity’s
facilities where members of the public, participants in services, programs or
activities . . . are allowed to go.” 133
Unlike the ADA, the Rehab Act provides no definition for service animals. 134
Rather, the Rehab Act instructs covered entities to propose regulations that comply
with the nondiscrimination provisions of Section 504. 135 These regulations must
then be submitted to the appropriate committee in Congress. 136 Some agencies
125
126
127
128
129

130
131

132
133
134
135
136

Compare 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(i)(2)(ii)–(iii), with id. § 35.136(b).
See id. § 35.136.
See id. § 35.136(f).
Id.
Id. Miniature horses have been noted as particularly useful for balance issues. See, e.g., Melissa Breyer,
Why Miniature Horses Make Such Great Service Animals, TREEHUGGER,
https://www.treehugger.com/animals/why-miniature-horses-make-such-great-service-animals.html (last
updated May 10, 2020).
28 C.F.R. § 35.136(f).
See Frequently Asked Questions About Service Animals and the ADA, U.S. DEP’T JUST. C.R. DIVISION (July
20, 2015), https://www.ada.gov/regs2010/service_animal_qa.html.
See id.
28 C.F.R. § 35.136(g).
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 705, 794 (2018).
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2018) (“The head of each such agency shall promulgate such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the amendments to this section . . . .”).
Id. (“Copies of any proposed regulation shall be submitted to appropriate authorizing committees of the
Congress, and such regulation may take effect no earlier than the thirtieth day after the date on which such
regulation is so submitted to such committees.”).
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subject to the Rehab Act, such as the SSA, have chosen to adopt the ADA’s
requirements. 137
The FHA defines service animals by referring to the ADA’s definition. 138 The
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) also notes that
entities, such as public housing or multi-unit housing, likely have to comply with
some combination of the ADA, the Rehab Act, and the FHA. 139 As such, the agency’s
choice to defer to the ADA’s definition of service animal is logical—those entities
covered under the FHA and one or more other reasonable accommodations laws
may streamline its process for providing such accommodations. HUD’s choice
exemplifies an early, albeit incomplete, attempt at a streamlined federal approach
to emotional support animals. 140
Until early 2021, the ACAA’s service animal definition was by far the
greatest departure from the ADA. 141 Specifically, the ACAA made no distinction
between an animal trained to assist with a disability or disabilities and one that
merely assists with a disability or disabilities by providing emotional support. 142
Under the ACAA, both fell within the definition of a service animal. 143 Furthermore,
the ACAA and the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) interpretations of the
ACAA made little attempt to clarify which animals could be considered service
animals for airline travel purposes. 144 Instead, the DOT clarified that an airline is
“never required to accept snakes, reptiles, ferrets, rodents, sugar gliders, and
spiders” 145 and reserved the right to deny other animals for a prescribed list of
reasons. 146 The DOT also dictated how airlines determined whether an animal
qualifies as a service animal under the ACAA, including “credible verbal
assurances,” identifying tags or tethering devices, documentation for animals
137
138

139
140
141
142

143
144
145
146

HALLEX I-2-0-8(A)(4), supra note 112.
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 14, at 1. However, HUD also notes that both types of
assistance animals (service and emotional support) are eligible for reasonable accommodations under the
FHA. Id. at 2 n.4 (clarifying that “[a]ssistance animals are sometimes referred to as ‘service animals,’
‘assistive animals,’ [or] ‘support animals’ . . . . To avoid confusion with the revised ADA ‘service animal’
definition discussed in Section II of this notice, or any other standard, [the FHA] use[s] the term ‘assistance
animal’ to ensure that housing providers have a clear understanding of their obligations under the [FHA]
and Section 504.”).
Id. at 1.
See infra Part III.A.
Compare Service Animals (Including Emotional Support Animals), supra note 114, with 28 C.F.R. § 35.104
(2020).
However, the ACAA did not prescribe accommodations for animals that assist, but are not trained to assist,
with a physical disability. See Service Animals (Including Emotional Support Animals), supra note 114
(“Under the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA) a service animal is any animal that is individually trained or
able to provide assistance to a person with a disability; or any animal that assists persons with disabilities
by providing emotional support. Documentation may be required of passengers needing to travel with an
emotional support or psychiatric service animal.”).
Id.
Id. (noting that any animal can be considered a service animal for airline travel).
Id.
Id. (explaining that airlines may exclude animals because of size, weight, health and safety, disruption to
“cabin service,” and foreign country prohibitions).
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assisting with psychiatric disabilities, and observable behaviors. 147 This varied
significantly from the ADA—the ADA makes no statements on behavior or
identifying tethers and does not require documentation of the animal’s status. 148
The ACAA’s significant departure from the ADA changed very recently. On
February 5, 2020, the DOT issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in which it asked
for public comment on amendments to the ACAA’s definition of service animal. 149
This rule became final on December 2, 2020, and entered effect on January 11,
2021, to the chagrin of many pet-clad travelers and stakeholders across the
country. 150 It made the ACAA definition of service animals functionally identical to
that of the ADA. 151 As justifications for its rulemaking, the DOT pointed to the
inconsistent federal definition of service animals, unusual species allowed under the
current rule, and safety risks posed by emotional support animals. 152
While on its face, the ACAA revisions align with the proposals of this Article,
a deeper dive reveals a problematic effect that will likely lead to less clarity and
trust, two considerations this Article considers paramount. Specifically, the ACAA
revisions remove any accommodation opportunities for service animals that are not
dogs. 153 As this Article will discuss later, animals other than dogs—mainly cats and,
in rarer circumstances, miniature horses—can provide some of the same services as
dogs without harming the delicate balance between legitimacy, efficacy, and
legality.
When an animal does not meet the qualifications specified under each law, it
may qualify as an emotional support animal. 154 However, most of these laws either
have different frameworks or completely lack a framework for emotional support
animals. The following section discusses each law’s approach to emotional support
animals.
ii. Emotional Support Animals Defined
Like the definition of service animals under each federal law, there is much
variation for how each law defines emotional support animals. The ADA’s definition
147
148
149
150
151

152

153
154

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 132, 137.
Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 85 Fed. Reg. 6,448, 6,448 (proposed Feb. 5, 2020) (to be codified at
14 C.F.R. pt. 382).
Id.
Compare 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (“Service animal means any dog that is individually trained to do work or
perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric,
intellectual, or other mental disability.”), with Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 85 Fed. Reg. 79,742,
79,774 (Dec. 2, 2020) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382) (“Service animal means a dog, regardless of breed
or type, that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of a qualified individual with
a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability.”).
Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 85 Fed. Reg. at 6,449–50. The final rule also affects the ACAA’s
policies on emotional support animals, which will be addressed in the following section. See infra Part
II.A.ii.
Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 85 Fed. Reg. at 79,743, 79,774.
See id. at 79,743.
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of service animal, or lack thereof, is the most straightforward. 155 The ADA’s
definition of service animal specifically excludes emotional support as a potential
task for service animals. 156 The Rehab Act makes no attempt to define emotional
support animals. 157
Like its definition of service animals, the FHA refers to the ADA’s delineation
between service and emotional support animals for guidance in defining the
latter. 158 Conceivably, an individual with an emotional disability may have an
animal trained to assist with that disability. That animal would be a service animal
under the ADA and, as such, must be accommodated by a covered entity. 159 With
respect to emotional support animals, HUD clarified that a housing provider may
request documentation of need from a mental health professional as proof of the
animal’s emotional comfort to its owner. 160 However, as Section B will discuss, the
FHA does not make the same reasonable accommodations foreclosures as the ADA
with respect to emotional support animals. 161
Until January 2021, the ACAA made no distinction between animals
classically thought of as for service and those thought of as for emotional support.
Instead, it made species-based restrictions that reflected public health, safety, and
logistical considerations. 162 As discussed in the previous section, however, the
DOT’s new rule changes the assistive animal definition. 163 The new rule and
subsequent ACAA revision classifies emotional support animals as pets, 164 meaning
airlines are no longer required to reasonably accommodate these animals. Now, any
airline may exclude any non-canine animal for any reason, regardless of whether
another federal legal framework would consider them to be a service animal. As
discussed later in this Article, this revision does not serve the public good in a way
that comports with a fair balance of stakeholder interests. 165
How these federal laws define both service and emotional support animals is
key to understanding how owners may seek accommodations under each law. The
155
156
157
158
159

160

161
162
163

164
165

See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2020).
Id. (“[T]he provision of emotional support, well-being, comfort, or companionship do[es] not constitute work .
. . for the purposes of this definition.”).
See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2018).
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 14, at 1.
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (defining service animal as “[a]ny dog that is individually trained to do work or
perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric,
intellectual, or other mental disability” (emphasis added)).
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 14, at 3–4 (“For example, the housing provider may ask
persons who are seeking a reasonable accommodation for an assistance animal that provides emotional
support to provide documentation from a physician, psychiatrist, social worker, or other mental health
professional that the animal provides emotional support that alleviates one or more of the identified
symptoms or effects of an existing disability.”).
See infra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.A.i; see also Service Animals (Including Emotional Support Animals), supra note 114
(remarking that any animal can be considered a service animal for airline travel).
Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 85 Fed. Reg. 79,742, 79,743, 79,774 (Dec. 2, 2020) (to be codified at
14 C.F.R. pt. 382).
Id.
See infra Part III.
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following section will address the reasonable accommodations languages—the
varying nature of which further exemplifies the need for greater uniformity of
emotional support animal classifications under federal law.
B. Assistive Animals as Reasonable Accommodations
Disabled individuals use assistive animals for a variety of reasons, including
as guide dogs, 166 stability aids, 167 and emotional support. 168 A disabled individual
must be able to use their assistive animal where doing so is required as a method of
reasonable accommodation. Many of these spaces, like federal offices, housing, and
planes, are governed by the four relevant federal laws. 169 These laws—the ADA, the
Rehab Act, the FHA, and the ACAA—then, have the power to make spaces
accessible when used effectively and inaccessible when used ineffectively. The
following two subsections will discuss how these laws set parameters for service and
emotional support animals in the spaces they govern. This discussion provides
critical support for this Article’s suggested revisions, 170 which would standardize
the approach to emotional support animals and redress the situation.
i. Service Animals as Reasonable Accommodations
Each of the four laws mandate reasonable accommodations be provided to an
individual’s service animal. 171 The ADA, however, sets limits upon when the
accommodations are no longer reasonable. Specifically, under applicable
regulations, a service animal may be excluded where it is not under the control of
the owner or handler or when it is not housebroken. 172 The owner or handler must
also care for and supervise the service animal while within the covered entity; to not
do so implicitly allows the covered entity to exclude the service animal. 173 Where
the service animal is properly excluded, the disabled individual may seek access to
the entity in its absence. 174 Where the disabled individual feels that their service
animal was improperly excluded, they may seek redress in a method prescribed by
the relevant law. 175

166
167
168
169
170
171

172
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174
175

Dog Guides for People with Vision Loss, supra note 11.
See Breyer, supra note 129.
See, e.g., Everything You Need to Know About Emotional Support Animals, AM. KENNEL CLUB (Feb. 24,
2021), https://www.akc.org/expert-advice/news/everything-about-emotional-support-animals/.
See supra Part I.C.
See infra Part III.A.
See Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (2018) (referring to ADA’s definition of service animal); 14 C.F.R. §
382.27 (2020); 28 C.F.R. § 35.136 (2020); Service Animals (Including Emotional Support Animals), supra
note 114, at 1.
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(b), (d).
See id. § 35.136(e).
See id. § 35.136(c).
See infra Part II.B.ii.
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While the Rehab Act does not specify that service animals require reasonable
accommodation, many covered entities have chosen to adopt the ADA’s approach to
service animals for disabled individuals. 176 As such, these entities bear an
obligation to reasonably accommodate service animals under Section 504—to not do
so would be an exclusion of a qualified disabled individual under that Section. 177
This does not include significant structural alterations, which small providers are
still not required to make where a suitable alternative exists. 178 Covered entities
that adopt the ADA approach can exclude an otherwise qualified animal, such as for
lack of control or housetraining. 179
Like the ADA, the FHA requires that covered entities provide reasonable
accommodations for disabled individuals’ service animals. 180 This is true even for
housing providers who otherwise do not allow animals, such as via a “no pet”
policy. 181 However, if accommodating the animal would place an “undue financial or
administrative burden” or “fundamentally alter the nature” upon the covered
entity’s services, the entity need not accommodate the service animal. 182 The entity
may not charge a fee or deposit in connection with the service animal but may
require that the disabled individual pay for damages beyond normal wear and tear
associated with keeping an animal in the space. 183 The housing provider may also
exclude where there is a cognizable, objective determination that the animal poses a
“direct threat of harm” or would cause “substantial physical damage to the
property.” 184 Like the ADA and the Rehab Act, the FHA allows a disabled individual
who believes they were wrongly denied reasonable accommodations to seek
redress. 185
Like the other three relevant laws, the ACAA requires reasonable
accommodations for service animals. 186 A service animal must be allowed to
accompany a passenger in the seat where the passenger sits unless doing so blocks
an aisle or emergency exit; in such cases, the passenger should be assigned a less
obstructive seat. 187 Foreign air carriers under the ACAA’s jurisdiction are only
required to allow service dogs. 188 Passengers who will board a flight with a service
176
177

178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

187
188

See, e.g., HALLEX I-2-0-8(A)(4), supra note 112.
See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2018) (“No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as
defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination . . . .”).
See id. § 794(c).
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(b), (i)(2)(ii)–(iii).
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., supra note 14, at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part II.B.ii.
See 14 C.F.R. § 382.27; see also U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NEW HORIZONS: INFORMATION FOR THE AIR TRAVELER
WITH A DISABILITY 11 (2009),
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/Horizons_2009_Final_0.pdf.
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 186.
Id.
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animal need not provide advance notice of their intent to do so. 189 Individuals who
believe an airline did not follow the procedures prescribed by the ACAA may
attempt to seek redress from the DOT or the airline, but no private right of action
currently exists for these individuals. 190
All four of the federal statutes guarantee reasonable accommodations for
disabled individuals’ service animals. However, not all four guarantee the same for
disabled individuals with emotional support animals. To fully understand the
current landscape for these animals, the following section will address disabled
individuals’ rights under each statute and how each of these accommodation rules
are utilized to bring absurd and untenable animals into public spaces, apartments,
and airplanes. 191
ii. Emotional Support Animals as Reasonable Accommodations
The ADA only requires reasonable accommodations for service animals, not
emotional support animals. 192 As such, individuals with an emotional support
animal seeking to enter a space covered by the ADA may be turned away without
repercussions to the entity. 193 Because the ADA would not require accommodations
for anything other than a dog or miniature horse, dogs and miniature horses that
fail the permissible inquiry required by the ADA 194 could also be excluded under the
same rationale. 195 Because entities bear no obligation to accommodate individuals
presenting with emotional support animals, an individual denied access because of
such an animal has no redress available under the ADA.
The Rehab Act makes no mention of service animals or emotional support
animals. 196 Whether an agency chooses to adopt the ADA or another framework for
reasonable accommodations will determine an emotional support animal’s access to
spaces covered under the Rehab Act. 197 If the covered entity does not allow
emotional support animals in its space, an individual who brings one cannot seek
redress under the Rehab Act since no violation occurred. This inconsistency is
exemplary of the need for a consistent standard—the variability between
accommodations under various covered entities poses a problem for individuals who
seek consistent, accessible standards under federal law.
Unlike the ADA, the FHA does require reasonable accommodation of
emotional support animals. 198 However, the housing provider may request
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

14 C.F.R. § 382.27 (2020).
See id. §§ 382.151–.159; see also U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 186, at 12.
See infra Part II.C.
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2020); see also id. § 35.136.
See id. §§ 35.104, 35.136.
See supra Part II.A.i.
See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 35.136.
29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (2018).
See supra Part II.B.i.
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 14, at 1–2.
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additional information from an individual seeking accommodation for their
emotional support animal. HUD notes that such documentation is generally a
statement of need from a mental health professional, and that this is sufficient to
require a housing provider required to reasonably accommodate the animal. 199
Where an individual is denied for lack of documentation or otherwise insufficient
proof of the animal’s emotionally supportive qualities, no redress is available. 200
Until January 2021, the ACAA was by far the most generous law with
respect to accommodating emotional support animals. 201 Before then, the ACAA
recognized animals that provide emotional support as true service animals. 202
Airlines could request documentation of need from a mental health professional to
confirm the animal’s status as an emotional support animal. 203 Now, the DOT
imposes no requirement upon airlines to accommodate emotional support animals of
any breed in any manner—rather, they may simply treat them as pets. 204 Unlike
the ADA, Rehab Act, and FHA, however, the ACAA has no provision for a private
right of action. 205
In sum, the four statutes vary greatly in their treatment of service and
emotional support animals. Since some statutes differentiate between the
reasonable accommodation requirements (or lack thereof) for service and emotional
support animals, an individual traveling from one covered entity to another may
face different accessibility requirements at each covered entity. Likewise, the
individual’s redress for denial of access varies under each law. Because of these
variations, especially the leniency in the FHA regulations, individuals can utilize
these leniencies to introduce “emotional support” animals into spaces covered by
these laws. 206 The same is not true for the ADA, Rehab Act, and now the ACAA,
none of which prescribe reasonable accommodation requirements for emotional
support animals. 207 These leniencies, or gaps, are exploited to gain fee-free access
for particularly unique animals.
C. Examples of the Gaps Exploited in Housing and on Planes
While Dexter and Ventiko made national news, their story is not the only
interesting example of a particularly unique emotional support animal on a flight or
199
200
201
202

203
204
205

206
207

Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
This flexibility changed following the final rule discussed in Part II. Traveling with Service Animals by Air,
85 Fed. Reg. 79,742, 79,743 (Dec. 2, 2020) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382); see supra Part II.
See Service Animals (Including Emotional Support Animals), supra note 114 (noting that any animal can be
considered a service animal for airline travel); see also supra Part II.A.ii;
Service Animals (Including Emotional Support Animals), supra note 114.
Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 85 Fed. Reg. at 79,743.
Air Carrier Access Amendments Act of 2019, H.R. 1549, 116th Cong. § 2(b)(6) (2019) (“Unlike other civil rights
statutes, the ACAA does not contain a private right of action, which is critical to the enforcement of civil
rights statutes.”).
See infra Part III.A, III.B.
See supra text accompanying notes 197–202.
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in housing. 208 Rather, their story exemplifies a larger national conversation
surrounding emotional support animals—what are they and where can they go?
The FHA prescribes certain protections for both service and emotional
support animals in the spaces it governs. 209 Both service and emotional support
animals have a right of reasonable accommodation under the FHA, and the covered
entity must not charge fees for the presence of either. 210 Furthermore, neither law
defines what can and cannot be considered a service animal. 211
Until January 2021, the ACAA was the most lenient and nebulous law
highlighted within this article. The DOT allowed all assistive animals—service and
otherwise—to be treated as service animals, with breed and other restrictions in
place. 212 Now, the ACAA has gone in the opposite direction. 213 While the FHA’s
over-broad definition of assistive animals presents challenges for consistency, the
ACAA’s under-broad definition (only requiring airlines to permit service dogs)
presents concerns regarding fairness and usefulness. 214
These leniencies, and now over-restrictions, create exploitable gaps in the
federal reasonable accommodation laws: If a monkey can be an emotional support
animal, and a mental health professional will sign a statement of need, 215 could an
individual bring a monkey onto a plane or into their apartment without incurring a
fee for the monkey’s presence in either space? Potentially, the answer is yes, even if
evidence suggests emotional support animals are not terribly effective. 216 The
following sections explore the presence of unique animals in airlines (such as in
ticket lines and on flights) and housing to fully depict the need for the proposed
revisions. This section will lay the foundation for Part III’s justifications for limiting
these unique animals’ entry into spaces covered by the four previously discussed
federal laws.

208

209
210
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See, e.g., Harriet Baskas, More Trouble for the Man who Flies with a Monkey, USA TODAY (Aug. 17, 2016,
1:49 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/todayinthesky/2016/08/17/emotional-supportmonkey-marmoset/88899586/ (emotional support monkey on a flight); see also Cynthia Zhou, Miu the
Emotional Support Pigeon, PALOMACY PIGEON & DOVE ADOPTIONS (Mar. 6, 2017),
http://www.pigeonrescue.org/2017/03/06/miu-is-an-emotional-support-animal/ (emotional support pigeon in
a college apartment).
See supra Part II.B.
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 14, at 4.
See Service Animals (Including Emotional Support Animals), supra note 114 (noting what species airlines
are never required to accommodate but excluding none outright); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN
DEV., supra note 14, at 1.
See Service Animals (Including Emotional Support Animals), supra note 114.
See Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 85 Fed. Reg. 79,742, 79,743, 79,774 (Dec. 2, 2020) (to be codified
at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382).
See id.
See Baskas, supra note 208.
See, e.g., Kate Thayer, Despite the Popularity of Emotional Support Animals, Experts Say There’s Little
Evidence They Work, CHI. TRIB. (May 30, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-lifeemotional-support-animals-evidence-20180521-story.html.
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i. In Housing
People across the country have brought strange “emotional support animals”
into housing situations. 217 This section highlights three particular examples—an
alligator, twenty chickens, and a pigeon—to exemplify the gaps in the FHA and how
they are exploited in an attempt to permit wild and untenable animals into housing.
Because the FHA left a gap in its definition of permissible emotional support
animals and only requires an easily fakeable statement of need, 218 people will
exploit it.
In Pennsylvania, one man has been prescribed an emotional support alligator
in place of taking psychiatric medications to ease his depression. 219 The four-yearold alligator, who scampers around the house with his emotional support animal
leash marked with an “ESA” tag, could eventually grow to weigh nearly half a ton
and be sixteen feet long. 220 Its owner, Joie Henney, says the alligator smacks his
tail or starts to wrestle as a sign of its affection. 221 He says most of his children and
grandchildren are fine with the alligator sharing a home with their patriarch. 222
While Henney has only one alligator, one man in Illinois keeps twenty
emotional support chickens on his land. 223 The disabled Marine, Luke Villotti,
received a note from the Veterans Administration documenting his need for the
chickens, but only for six of them. 224 Villotti also happens to live in a town that does
not allow for any chickens on residential property, let alone the twenty (and
sometimes more) that he maintains. 225 While neighbors have complained, Villotti
has yet to take any action to cull his flock down to the six that his statement of need
prescribes. 226
College students are also turning to unique species for emotional support. 227
While some seek comfort from cats and dogs, others look to more urban critters. 228
Take for instance Miu the pigeon, who lived with its owner—a University of
California at Berkeley student—in a college apartment. 229 Cynthia Zhou, its owner,
has even traveled on a plane with the pigeon since gaining documentation of her
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See Nark, supra note 19; Crosby, supra note 19; Zhou, supra note 208.
See Patricia Marx, Pets Allowed, NEW YORKER (Oct. 13, 2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/20/pets-allowed.
Nark, supra note 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Crosby, supra note 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Zhou, supra note 208.
See id.
See id.
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need. 230 In addition to Miu, many other unique furry and feathered animals have
been brought on flights.
ii. On Planes
This section highlights absurd examples that arose under prior iterations of
the ACAA assistive animal regime. They are provided here because, given the
massive fairness implications of the new DOT final rule, I consider it a distinct
possibility that the DOT will have to backtrack or revise its rules in some way.
Where Ventiko failed, others have succeeded, bringing birds, pigs, and even
monkeys onto flights as emotional support animals. 231 In an online opinion in the
Financial Times, one writer noted that he could never fly United Airlines with his
emotional support snake because of the post-Ventiko backlash. 232 He then went on
to provide, in detail, the consequences of anyone, including himself, getting too close
to his emotional support animal—a bite on the thumb. 233
The first of the interesting emotional support animal examples is Daniel the
duck, who was spotted on a flight from Charlotte, North Carolina, to Asheville,
North Carolina, in 2016. 234 Daniel was accompanying his owner, Carla Fitzgerald,
who suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. 235 Daniel could be seen walking
the aisles throughout the short flight and even made a short appearance as a
Twitter star. 236 As of the time of the flight, Daniel was not a recognized emotional
support animal but his owner indicated she was hoping to have him “formally
registered.” 237 It is unclear whether the owner paid a fee to bring Daniel onto the
flight, or if the airline imposed any restrictions on Daniel’s movement throughout
the flight, although there seem to have been none. 238
A pig attempted to fly with its owner from Connecticut on a US Airways
flight in 2014. 239 The pig, tethered to a leash, could reportedly be smelled by
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Id.
See Emotional Support Duck Daniel is Winning Over the Internet, FOX NEWS (Oct. 19, 2016),
https://www.foxnews.com/travel/emotional-support-duck-daniel-is-winning-over-the-internet; Rheana
Murray, Here’s Proof Pigs Actually Do Fly (Almost), ABC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2014, 6:43 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/proof-pigs-fly/story?id=27222136; Baskas, supra note 208.
The airline also banned peacocks and hedgehogs on their flights. Jonathan Guthrie, The Pet Snake? It’s My
Emotional Support Animal, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/b6c72122-1247-11e88cb6-b9ccc4c4dbbb.
Id.
Emotional Support Duck Daniel is Winning Over the Internet, supra note 231; John Boyle, Emotional
Support Duck Owner Speaks out, CITIZEN TIMES (Oct. 18, 2016, 11:31 AM), https://www.citizentimes.com/story/news/local/2016/10/18/emotional-support-duck-owner-everybody-loved-him/92352986/.
Boyle, supra note 254.
See id.
Fitzgerald is likely referring to a lack of documentation from a mental health professional regarding her
need for Daniel. Id.
See id.
Murray, supra note 231.
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passengers on the flight. 240 One passenger recounted that they had reservations
about being on the same flight as the creature. 241 Before the flight could depart,
however, the owner and pig had to deboard after the pig became disruptive. 242
American Airlines, the parent company for US Airways at that time, confirmed the
pig boarded the flight as an emotional support animal. 243
In 2016, Jason Ellis made it onto Frontier Airlines’ no-fly list for not
declaring his emotional support marmoset, a species of monkey, on a flight to Las
Vegas, Nevada, from Columbus, Ohio. 244 A flight attendant spotted the marmoset,
Gizmo, peeking out of Ellis’s shirt. 245 An airline spokesperson said Ellis earned his
spot on the list for noncompliance with airline emotional support animal policies,
including failing to provide documentation ahead of the flight. 246 Ellis detailed
varying accounts of the missing documentation. 247 In either case, he and Gizmo had
to take a Southwest flight for their return trip. 248 It is unclear whether Ellis
provided any documentation to Southwest ahead of boarding. 249
In addition to the animals who famously succeeded in boarding flights,
several others have been turned away. A hamster made news when it was flushed
down a toilet at Baltimore/Washington International Airport in 2018. 250 According
to its owner, Belen Aldecosea, Spirit Airlines initially told her the animal would be
permitted to board as an emotional support animal. 251 Upon arrival, attendants
informed her otherwise. 252 Aldecosea alleged that a representative suggested she
flush the animal since she would not be allowed to board with it. 253 She acted in
accordance with the alleged suggestion. 254 While Spirit admitted its representatives
gave incorrect information about the emotional support hamster’s admissibility
before Aldecosea arrived, the airline vehemently denied that any employee
suggested she injure the animal. 255
None of these examples would be possible, or nearly as easy, if the ACAA had
not left the door open for them. By allowing passengers to claim any animal as an
240
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Daniella Silva & Anthony Consumano, Hamster Flushed Down Toilet after College Student’s Pet Denied
Flight on Spirit Airlines, NBC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2018, 6:21 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/airplanemode/hamster-flushed-down-toilet-after-college-student-s-pet-denied-n846116.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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emotional support animal, subject to select airline-dependent restrictions, 256 the
ACAA-covered entities were ripe for exploitation of free animal flights. This limited
variety of strange emotional support animals further exhibits the need for reform—
where there is a gap, someone will take advantage of it.
Emotional support animals of every variety have claimed fame in the public
eye. But the question remains: Are these animals truly providing emotional
support? If they are, is their doing so in the best interest of the public? Given the
safety concerns associated with unusual species (such as alligators and snakes), the
answer is likely no in some cases. But that is not to say that no animals should
qualify as emotional support animals. The following Part outlines and discusses the
proposed revisions.
III. PARING DOWN THE PEACOCKS: PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE EMOTIONAL
SUPPORT ANIMAL REQUIREMENTS
Assistive animals play a key role in the lives of disabled individuals.
However, when gaps in the four federal statutes and their accompanying
regulations allow absurdly untenable, wild, and exotic pets to occupy the dialogue,
the gaps delegitimize the true purpose of the reasonable accommodation
requirements that the ADA originally intended. Further complicating the dialogue,
as New Yorker writer Patricia Marx said, is that “people are baffled by the
distinction between service animals and emotional-support animals.” 257 This is an
understandable confusion, given that so many sites offer forms, paraphernalia, and
even telephone consultations to assist anyone in registering almost anything as an
emotional support animal. 258
When animals of nearly every species access spaces in which they do not
belong under the guise of being emotional support animals, one must look to the
laws allowing the existence of such emotional support animals for explanation.
While Marx may have primarily relied on state statutes, her ability to bring a turtle
into a Christian Louboutin store, a snake into a Chanel store, and an alpaca into
her local drugstore 259 is indicative of a national problem as well. This is the problem
this Article ultimately seeks to address. Namely, this Part outlines proposed
revisions designed to alleviate the confusion surrounding emotional support
animals and their role for individuals with disabilities. First, Section A will detail
the framework this Article proposes. Next, Section B will elaborate upon the
justifications for the framework—decreased fraudulent misrepresentation of pets as
emotional support animals; decreased misrepresentation of absurdly untenable,
256

257
258
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See, e.g., Kate Gibson, American Airlines Bans Insects, Hedgehogs, Goats, Ferrets as Inflight Service
Animals, CBS NEWS (May 15, 2018, 1:02 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/american-airlines-bansservice-animals-insects-goats-ferrets-hedgehogs/.
Marx, supra note 218.
In her article, Marx recounts using one such service to register a snake as an emotional support animal. Id.
She also purchased an “ESA” badge on Amazon.com for a turtle. Id. She then brought the turtle into a
museum, high-end shoe store, nail salon, and funeral home. Id.
Id.
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wild, or exotic pets as emotional support animals; and increased accessibility to
qualified emotional support animals. Finally, Section C will reflect upon the results
and implications that would follow these reforms.
A. Proposed Revisions
The four federal statutes addressed previously all require reasonable
accommodations for disabled individuals using service animals. 260 The allowance of
service animals and the ensuing precedents, memos, and options for redress all
make this a time-tested accommodation. The same is not true for emotional support
animals because none of the statutes discussed creates a workable, consistent
standard for these animals, as seen by the innovative misuse of the allowance. 261
The gaps left in the four federal statutes allowing for exploitative use of
emotional support animal accommodations need to be filled. To do so, legislators
should look to the existing regulations regarding service animals. Namely, the
permissible inquiry that the ADA utilizes for service animals should be copied and
implemented for emotional support animals. The ADA allows for staff at covered
facilities to ask two questions to an individual presenting with a service animal (or
miniature horse): 262 First, is this animal used in connection with a disability?263
Second, is the animal trained to perform a task that assists with that disability? 264
Where the service animal is trained to perform a specific task that assists a
disabled individual, the entity is required to accommodate the individual and
animal. 265
With respect to an emotional support animal, the proposed permissible
inquiry must be slightly different—this Article does not propose emotional support
animals be required to perform a task. Such a requirement would make any
qualifying animal also a service animal. 266 However, the animal very well could
perform a task if that task provides emotional support. 267 The first inquiry,
however, remains the same, is this animal required in connection with a disability?
Second, does the animal provide emotional support, by its presence or a task it
performs, 268 in connection with a disability?
Simply crafting a permissible inquiry does not, on its own, fill the gaps.
Rather, Congress must in tandem implement a list of species that may qualify as
emotional support animals, thereby excluding those species not enumerated. This
260
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See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.C.
28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 35.136(i) (2020); see also ADA Requirements: Service Animals, supra note 9.
§§ 35.104, 35.136(i); ADA Requirements: Service Animals, supra note 9.
§§ 35.104, 35.136(i); ADA Requirements: Service Animals, supra note 9.
§§ 35.104, 35.136(i); ADA Requirements: Service Animals, supra note 9.
§§ 35.104, 35.136(i); ADA Requirements: Service Animals, supra note 9.
This would still clearly demarcate emotional support animals from service animals, the latter of which may
not be used solely to provide emotional support. § 35.104.
See id.
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requirement also mirrors that of service animals, where only dogs are eligible to
qualify. 269 However, since emotional support animals—unlike service animals—
need not be trained to perform a task, the list of qualified species can go beyond
merely dogs without consequence to the merits of the revisions proposed.
Instead of only allowing dogs, the list should also include miniature horses
and cats. Miniature horses are already eligible for accommodations under the ADA
as quasi-service animals 270 and are often used as therapy animals, 271 making them
a naturally suited and time-tested species to be considered eligible for use as
emotional support animals. Additionally, the DOT has already noted that miniature
horses are ideal for those needing an assistance animal while maintaining “allergen
avoidance.” 272 As with their classification as quasi-service animals, 273 a miniature
horse should still exist in parallel to that of the emotional support designation and
be subjected to additional health, safety, and logistical considerations before being
accommodated. While cats do not qualify as service animals, 274 many offer
emotional support to their owners. 275 Additionally, many organizations use cats as
therapy animals. 276 Their long-standing presence as human companions makes
them a normal species to accommodate in certain spaces.
Like the requirements for service animals, there should be no requirement to
seek professional opinion regarding the necessity of an emotional support animal.
First, the statement of need requirement has naturally created an industry of
online and in person “prescription farms”—websites and organizations where
interested pet owners may briefly discuss their mental health with a licensed
professional with whom they likely have no previous or ongoing therapeutic
relationship. 277 As Marx recounts in her New Yorker article, she was able to obtain
a “prescription” for a snake without any discussion of her elaborate, fabricated need
for an emotional support animal. 278 Second, requiring such a letter does nothing for

269
270
271

272
273
274
275
276
277

278

Id.
28 C.F.R. § 35.136(i)(3) (“Paragraphs 35.136(c) through (h) of this section, which apply to service animals
[that are dogs], shall also apply to miniature horses.”).
William H. Anger Jr. & Sybil Akins, Pet Therapy, 18 J. CONSUMER HEALTH ON INTERNET 396, 396–97 (2014);
see also Gentle Carousel Mission Statement, GENTLE CAROUSEL MINIATURE THERAPY HORSES,
https://gentlecarouseltherapyhorses.com/about/our-mission/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2020).
The avoidable allergen appears to be dog or cat dander. See Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 83 Fed.
Reg. 23,832, 23,837 (proposed May 23, 2018) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382).
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(i)(3) (“Paragraphs 35.136(c) through (h) of this section, which apply to service
animals [that are dogs], shall also apply to miniature horses.”).
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (defining a service animal as “any dog.”).
See THE DOMESTIC CAT: THE BIOLOGY OF ITS BEHAVIOR 200 (Dennis C. Turner & Patrick Bateson eds., 2d ed.
2000).
See Anger & Akins, supra note 271, at 396–97.
See Get a Prescription Letter, NAT’L SERV. ANIMAL REGISTRY, https://www.nsarco.com/esa-letter-therapistreferral.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2020); see also CHILHOWEE PSYCHOL. SERVS., https://www.cptas.com/ (last
visited Jan. 11, 2020).
See Marx, supra note 218.
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those who cannot afford a need analysis but have a mental health disorder which
would be mitigated by the use of an emotional support animal. 279
Finally, for the permissible inquiry and approved list of species to truly fill
the federal regulatory gaps, they need to be identical across the four federal
statutes. Federal law should not be an incomplete or inconsistent web of definitions
and requirements that a disabled individual must somehow navigate. Rather, the
ADA, the Rehab Act, the FHA, and the ACAA should bifurcate “service” and
“emotional support” animals and implement the permissible inquiry and approved
species list as described above.
Naturally, there are arguments to the contrary. For instance, some argue
that the bifurcation between service and emotional support animals should be
eliminated entirely. 280 Professor Amanda M. Foster argues, for example, that the
four federal statutes should be revised to implement the broader service animal
classification, thereby requiring reasonable accommodations for animals only
providing emotional support in all entities covered by these laws. 281 These revisions
would mean that untrained emotional support animals would be elevated to the
same level of legal protection as service animals. 282 Critically, however, Foster
makes no attempts to enumerate a list of species which may qualify for protection
under her proposed broader service animal category. 283
Foster’s argument originates from a point of reason: the general public does
not always take psychiatric disabilities as seriously as physical ones. 284 However,
the argument fails to adequately address the issue it identifies: the Foster revisions
would allow an emotional support alligator to have the same level of legal protection
and physical access as a guide dog. Beyond the facial absurdity of such a scene lies a
deeper issue: eliminating the bifurcation between service and emotional support
animals under the four federal statutes does nothing to legitimize the value of
emotional support animals. Instead, the Foster revisions stay the course of current
dialogue, in the best case, and further delegitimize the value of emotional support
animals, in the worst case. 285
279

280

281
282

283
284

285

Christopher C. Ligatti, No Training Required: The Availability of Emotional Support Animals as a
Component of Equal Access for the Psychiatrically Disabled Under the Fair Housing Act, 35 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. 139, 141–43 (2010).
See, e.g., Amanda M. Foster, Don’t Be Distracted by the Peacock Trying to Board an Airplane: Why
Emotional Support Animals are Service Animals and Should be Regulated in the Same Manner, 82 ALB. L.
REV. 237, 238 (2019).
Id. at 264–65.
She does not state this explicitly, but it is the natural inference from her thesis that her argument fails to
address. See id. at 238.
Id. at 264.
Although there seems to be a trend toward equality on this front. See id. at 238; see also Kaiser
Permanente, National Poll: Mental Health Myths and Facts, FINDYOURWORDS,
https://findyourwords.org/mental-health-myths-facts-national-poll/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2020) (finding that
seventy-three percent of respondents agreed that psychiatric and physical disabilities should be treated
equally).
For instance, the DOT has already noted concerns from disability advocates about how allowing unusual
species of support animals may erode public trust of assistance animals generally, thereby reducing
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B. Justifications
Foster’s thesis falls short in understanding what she terms the “fallout” from
her proposed revisions. 286 Her revisions—while soundly rooted in increasing the
accessibility and legitimacy of emotional support animals—do not guarantee such
results. However, the revisions proposed here do achieve three primary results,
which ultimately justify the narrow brush with which these reforms paint emotional
support animals. These proposed revisions address three main problems plaguing
the emotional support animal landscape: (1) fraudulent misrepresentation of pets as
emotional support animals, (2) misrepresentation of absurdly untenable, wild, or
exotic pets as emotional support animals, and (3) lack of accessibility to emotional
support animals for disabled individuals who could greatly benefit from them.
i. Decreased Fraudulent Misrepresentation of Pets as Emotional
Support Animals
In the DOT’s previously discussed, recent notice of proposed rulemaking, 287 it
succinctly summarizes the first justification of the revisions proposed in Part
III(A): 288
Passengers wishing to travel with their pets may be falsely claiming
that their pets are service animals [and emotional support animals] so
they can take their pet in the aircraft cabin or avoid paying pet fees
charged by most airlines since airlines cannot charge service animal
users a fee to transport service animals. . . . There have also been
reports of some online entities that may, for a fee, provide individuals
with pets a letter stating that the individual is a person with a mental
or emotional disability and that the animal is an emotional support
animal or psychiatric service animal, when in fact it is not. 289
The DOT, through its recent rule change, has recognized the problem of fraudulent
misrepresentation that this Article’s proposed revisions seek to mitigate.
As of January 20, 2021, the National Service Animal Registry (“NSAR”) has
registered over 215,000 animals in its database. 290 The NSAR is a for-profit
enterprise that offers “certifications” for emotional support, service, and therapy

286
287
288
289
290

accessibility and protection for those who use assistance animals for legitimate purposes. Traveling by Air
with Service Animals, 83 Fed. Reg. 23,832, 23,834 (proposed May 23, 2018) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt.
382); see also Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 85 Fed. Reg. 6,448, 6,450 (proposed Feb. 5, 2018) (to be
codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382).
Foster, supra note 280, at 265.
See text accompanying notes 149–150, 163–164.
See supra Part III.A.
Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 85 Fed. Reg. at 6,450.
The exact figure was 215,804. See ESA and Service Dog Database, NAT’L SERV. ANIMAL REGISTRY,
https://www.nsarco.com/database.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
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animals in more than thirty countries. 291 The United States-based company offers
referrals to an online psychological consultation service provider called Chilhowee
Psychological Services. 292 The online service’s about page, which includes a stock
photo 293 of four individuals in suits—further reducing their legitimacy—notes in its
headline that it is “the Original Support Dog Letter Company.” 294
For service animals, the DOJ does not recognize any certification services and
notes do not convey any protections under the ADA. 295 While the DOJ refuses to
recognize any certifications for emotional support animals, that has not stopped the
public from questioning the authenticity of such services and the certificates they
provide. 296 From the industry perspective, the National Apartment Association has
noted that the lack of instructions from HUD, as well as the federal gaps generally,
make implementation of consistent and fair policies difficult for housing rental
companies. 297
The role of mental health professionals in the current system presents not
only a problem for regulators and accommodations providers (in the form of
fraudulent statements of need), but also for the mental health professionals
themselves. 298 While a therapeutic psychologist may engage in ongoing treatment of
a patient, a forensic psychologist applies their specialty “to assist in addressing
legal, contractual, and administrative matters.” 299 A practitioner who blends the
two roles may develop a conflict of interest by implicating bias and partiality. 300
Furthermore, such ethical dilemmas can lead to conflicts of interest between the
mental health professional’s original and collateral roles with an individual
patient. 301
291

292
293

294
295
296

297
298

299
300

301

What We Do, NAT’L SERV. ANIMAL REGISTRY, https://www.nsarco.com/what-we-do.html (last visited Jan. 11,
2020). See generally Frequently Asked Questions About Service Animals and the ADA, supra note 131
(noting that the DOJ does not recognize any certificates or registration for service animals).
Get a Prescription Letter, supra note 277.
A reverse image search revealed that the same photo has been used for attorney directory sites in
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. See About Us, CHILHOWEE PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVS.,
https://www.cptas.com/about.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2020).
Id.
Frequently Asked Questions About Service Animals and the ADA, supra note 131 (noting that the DOJ does
not recognize any certificates or registration for service animals).
See Throw Us a Bone: Clarity Needed on Emotional Support Animals, NAT’L APARTMENT ASS’N (June 4,
2019), https://www.naahq.org/news-publications/throw-bone-clarity-needed-emotional-support-animals;
Donna DiMaggio Berger, Tackling Fraudulent Emotional Support Animals, FLA. ASS’N OF COMMUNITY
PROFS. (Sept. 2017), https://www.fcapgroup.com/flcaj/flcaj-articles/tackling-fraudulent-emotional-supportanimals/.
See Throw Us a Bone: Clarity Needed on Emotional Support Animals, supra note 296.
See Jeffrey N. Younggren, Jennifer A. Boisvert & Cassandra L. Boness, Examining Emotional Support
Animals and Role Conflicts in Professional Psychology, 47 PROF. PSYCHOL. 255, 255 (2016).
See id. at 256 (quoting American Psychological Association, Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychology, 68
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1, 7–19 (2013)).
See id. Younggren et al. recommend that therapeutic practitioners include service disclaimers explaining
that they will not offer any forensic psychological services. See id. at 259.
Stuart A. Greenberg & Daniel W. Shuman, Irreconcilable Conflict Between Therapeutic and Forensic Roles,
28 PROF. PSYCHOL. 50, 50 (1997).
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When a psychologist interacts with a patient only in a forensic capacity,
ethical dilemmas still arise. 302 These professionals may be called upon to justify
their diagnosis in court or to an agency during a legal dispute. 303 As such, their
work should conform with the American Psychological Association’s (APA)
guidelines, including diagnosing only in light of existing scientific evidence and
after thorough review. 304 It is difficult to imagine how a quick phone call with a
mental health professional contacted via any number of the prescription farms
online would produce a diagnosis in light of either of the APA’s requirements. 305 In
Patricia Marx’s case, the mental health professional who ultimately “certified” her
snake did not even inquire into the nature of Marx’s disabilities that this emotional
support snake would mitigate. 306
By eliminating the role of mental health professionals in the emotional
support animal framework under federal law, the proposed revisions prevent future
abuse of therapeutic and forensic psychologists as a means of pet fee-free rental
agreements or air travel, or as a means of obtaining a letter to confuse other places
of public accommodation into granting access. 307 Furthermore, it solidifies the
illegitimacy of websites, like NSAR, that offer services exploiting the gaps in federal
law. For emotional support animals to be a truly legitimate form of disability
mitigation, 308 there needs to be an understanding that, like service animals, 309 a
prescription or statement of need is unnecessary.
ii. Decreased Misrepresentation of Absurdly Untenable, Wild, or Exotic
Pets as Emotional Support Animals
In addition to the decreased prevalence of general fraudulent use, this
Article’s proposed revisions would also decrease the misrepresentation of absurdly
untenable, wild, or exotic pets as emotional support animals. This would in turn
decrease the legitimacy of exotic animal owners like Karl and Kayla Mitchell of
Pahrump, Nevada. 310 The Mitchells won a long-fought battle with county
authorities over a permit to keep tigers on their property after Karl Mitchell
insisted that the wild big cats were his “emotional support tigers.” 311 This approval
302
303
304
305
306
307
308

309
310

311

See Younggren et al., supra note 298, at 259.
See id.
See id.
See id.; see also Marx, supra note 218.
See Marx, supra note 218.
See id.
See, e.g., BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, RIGHT TO EMOTIONAL SUPPORT ANIMALS IN “NO PET”
HOUSING 1 (2017), http://www.bazelon.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/2017-06-16-Emotional-SupportAnimal-Fact-Sheet-for-Website-final.pdf (summarizing research on the benefits of emotional support
animals in disability mitigation).
See Frequently Asked Questions About Service Animals and the ADA, supra note 131 (noting that service
animals do not require a statement of need).
Karin Brulliard, The Trouble with Tigers in America, WASH. POST (July 12, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/captive-tigers-america/.
Id.
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occurred in spite of Mitchell’s admission that he illegally purchased many of his
animals 312 from the now infamous tiger-breeder Joseph “Joe Exotic” MaldonadoPassage. 313 Maldonado-Passage made similar claims in less formal contexts, as
well. 314 While the Big Cat Public Safety Act would certainly solve the
misrepresentation of big cats as emotional support animals, it would not solve the
broad misuse of the classification for exotic species entirely. 315
There are already some regulations that attempt to prevent this misuse.
However, these regulations do not fully address the issue. By simply revising these
restrictions whenever a problem may arise or the governing agency perceives a
restriction should be made (as the DOT has done with the ACAA), the agency takes
a retroactive approach. Furthermore, it perpetuates the possibility for piecemeal
permissions and restrictions across the federal assistive animal landscape.
This is why the DOT’s January 2021 final rule is so troubling—where
Congressional inaction exists, federal inconsistencies arise. In the case of the ACAA
revisions, the DOT has taken a vastly more restrictive approach than any other of
the federal statutes. Instead of creating consistency, it sows doubt and illegitimacy
in the service animal process by limiting the service animal category to only require
dogs. 316
These revisions are proactive and standardize all four federal statutes.
Creating an enumerated list of eligible species—cats, dogs, and miniature horses—
efficiently eliminates all other species from consideration. Instead of having to
decide whether to allow a questionable animal aboard a plane or in a rented
apartment, the entity’s personnel may simply refer to the enumerated list and the
permissible inquiries. This revision, in turn, automatically excludes the pigs,
chickens, alligators, and peacocks from consideration at all.
iii. Increased Access to Qualified Emotional Support Animals
The final justification is one of burden shifting—eliminating the mandate to
obtain a statement of need and instead requiring covered entities to shift the
burden from the individual to the entity. This tends to make emotional support
312
313

314

315

316

Id.
The life of and controversies surrounding Joe “Exotic” Maldonado-Passage were recently featured in a
Netflix docuseries. See Emily Yahr, What to Know About ‘Tiger King,’ the Shocking Netflix Series That Has
Captivated the Internet, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/artsentertainment/2020/03/27/tiger-king-netflix-joe-exotic/.
See Not Your Average Joe, Tiger King: Murder, Mayhem and Madness, NETFLIX (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.netflix.com/watch/81130220?trackId=14277283&tctx=0%2C0%2C8ab17d77-8646-4ae3-b44cb46567e5591e-39762832%2C%2C.
Big Cat Public Safety Act, H.R. 1380, 116th Cong. (2019) (revising restrictions on possession of big cats to
entirely prohibit private ownership for personal use); see also Not Your Average Joe, Tiger King: Murder,
Mayhem and Madness, supra note 314.
An airline may allow other animals to be considered service animals and some pets to be considered
emotional support animals, but it is doubtful that any airline would go above and beyond the DOT
regulations for fear of mistakes or inconsistent applications. Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 85 Fed.
Reg. 79,742, 79,743 (Dec. 2, 2020) (to be codified at 14 CFR pt. 382).
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animals more accessible for those who truly need them. Specifically, eliminating the
statement of need requirement for emotional support animals means that disabled
individuals who cannot afford or properly access mental health services will not be
denied the benefit 317 of having an emotional support animal.
As the previous section discussed, mental health professionals may be
reticent to provide emotional support statements because of the ethical conflicts
arising from such an endeavor. 318 Moreover, eliminating the need for these
statements will decrease the attractiveness and use of online emotional support
prescription farms. Instead of asking for a document that someone can obtain with
one hundred dollars and internet access, 319 the covered entity may ask two simple
questions: First, is this animal required in connection with a disability? Second,
does the animal provide emotional support, by its presence or a task that it
performs, 320 in connection with a disability?
By standardizing federal law on emotional support animals—specifically,
using a permissible inquiry, enacting an enumerated list of qualified species, and
eliminating the requirement for a statement of need—these proposed revisions 321
will close the federal gap on assistive animal regulations. Doing so achieves the
three justifications outlined above, which tend to promote the legitimacy of
emotional support animals and their use in disability mitigation. 322
C. Results and Implications
A short reflection upon the select examples highlighted in Part II(C)
emphasizes the value of the proposed revisions. Namely, the existing dialogue on
emotional support animals is one of stories regarding the absurd misrepresentation
of strange animals as emotional support animals. 323 With the proposed revisions as
a framework for assistive animal reasonable accommodation requirements, the
dialogue changes.
While the proposed reforms inherently limit the ability to use certain species
as emotional support animals, the benefits outweigh the costs of doing so. Without
the proposed revisions, it is easy to imagine a service dog and an emotional support
chicken boarding the same flight. While the dog is specifically trained to assist its
handler with a disability, the benefits of the chicken may come at the cost of human
health concerns. 324 The exclusion of the latter is thus reasonably justified.
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
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See, e.g., BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 308.
See supra Part III.B.ii.
See Get a Prescription Letter, supra note 277.
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2020).
See supra Part III.A.
See, e.g., BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 308.
See supra Part II.C.
See, e.g., Human Health Concerns About Raining Poultry, ILL. DEP’T PUB. HEALTH (Mar. 2012),
http://www.idph.state.il.us/health/infect/Poultry.htm (noting that healthy chickens can expose humans to
salmonella and other public health concerns).
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In addition to public health issues, the existing framework presents
challenges for entities that must comply with it. Furthermore, the general public’s
uncertainty regarding the application of multiple federal laws on the subject 325 and
misunderstanding regarding where emotional support animals may be allowed 326
makes for a chaotic and challenging landscape. Where an emotional support animal
is improperly excluded, the entity that excluded the animal may implicate itself in
litigation or be mentioned in the individual’s complaint to a federal agency. 327
Conversely, where animals are improperly allowed, the entity may put others at
risk, including people using other assistive animals. As such, the need for stricter
guidelines is justifiable. The cost of doing so is not small, but it is necessary.
CONCLUSION
Dexter the peacock was never allowed to board the United Airlines flight. 328
However, where the peacock failed to go, many others succeeded. 329 Emotional
support animals are becoming an increasingly popular choice for disability
mitigation. 330 With their rise comes public dialogue and concern regarding the use
of certain emotional support animals in certain public spaces. 331 Many also wonder
whether these animals have any legitimate reason to be used. 332
The proposed revisions outlined in this Article are intended to ensure the
legitimacy of these animals. Specifically, standardizing the federal emotional
support animal definition decreases fraudulent misrepresentation of pets and
absurd animals as emotional support animals, and promotes accessibility of
emotional support animals to those who truly benefit from their use. 333 To achieve
these justifications, Congress should revise the four relevant federal statutes—the
ADA, the Rehab Act, the FHA, and the ACAA—to explicitly define an emotional
support animal as a dog, cat, or miniature horse that is trained to perform a task or
whose presence provides emotional support to a person with a disability. By
allowing the existing method of agency-specific regulatory promulgation, the gaps in
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Such as the ADA and FHA for housing providers. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 14,
at 5–6.
See Marx, supra note 218 (noting the use of a statement of need to allow an “emotional support” turtle
access to an art museum).
See supra Part II.B.
Bever & Rosenberg, supra note 2.
See Emotional Support Duck Daniel is Winning Over the Internet, supra note 231; Murray, supra note 231;
Baskas, supra note 208.
See Hal Herzog, Emotional Support Animals: The Therapist’s Dilemma, PSYCHOL. TODAY (July 19, 2016),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/animals-and-us/201607/emotional-support-animals-thetherapists-dilemma; see also Jeffrey N. Younggren, Cassandra L. Boness, Leisl M. Bryant & Gerald P.
Koocher, Emotional Support Animal Assessments: Toward a Standard and Comprehensive Model for
Mental Health Professionals, 51 PROF. PSYCHOL. 156, 156 (2019).
See Herzog, supra note 330; see also supra Part II.C.
See Marx, supra note 218.
See supra Part III.B.
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applicability, efficacy, and legitimacy will only continue. This is why Congress, and
not the individual agencies, must act.
This Article’s proposed new definition for emotional support animals would
mirror the ADA’s definition for a service animal. 334 Like the ADA service animal
framework, 335 an entity’s staff should be permitted to ask a series of questions 336 of
an individual who brings an emotional support animal to a place that is required to
comply with one or more of the four laws. This, too, should mirror the service
animal permissible inquiry. 337 Is this animal required because of a disability? Is it
trained to perform a task, or does its presence provide emotional support relating to
that disability? Finally, the four relevant statutes should explicitly prohibit
requiring a statement of need from a mental health professional. The DOJ 338 and
DOT 339 already recognize the abuse of such documents; removing this requirement
from the framework promotes fair, accessible use and limits fraudulent
misrepresentation of absurd animals with the façade of an online certificate. 340
Assistive animals positively affect the lives of many disabled individuals, but
the confusion regarding whether an animal may be an assistive animal (service or
emotional support) may confer a benefit to a savvy pet owner at society’s expense. If
emotional support animals are going to continue inhabiting apartments, traveling
on planes, and occupying public places, the ability to use them must be reformed.
The proposed revisions do just that—they keep the peacock off the plane.
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28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2020).
See id. § 35.136.
See id.
See id.
See Frequently Asked Questions About Service Animals and the ADA, supra note 131.
See Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 85 Fed. Reg. 6,448, 6,450 (Feb. 5, 2020) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. pt. 382) (“While the Department’s current service animal regulation permits airlines to require
documentation from a licensed mental health professional for the carriage of emotional support animals,
the advent of online entities that may be guaranteeing the required documentation for a fee has made it
difficult for airlines to determine whether passengers traveling with animals are traveling with their pets
or with legitimate emotional support animals.”); see also Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 83 Fed.
Reg. 23,832, 23,832 (proposed May 23, 2018) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382).
See supra Part III.B.

